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Abstract
This essay reformulates the question of human augmentation as a problem of advanced human-
machine communication, theorizing that such communication implies robust artificial intelligence and
necessitates understanding the relational role new technologies play in human-machine
communication. We focus on the questions, “When do electronic tools cease to be ‘simply’ tools, and
become meaningfully part of ourselves,” and, “When might we think of these tools as augmenting our
selves, rather than simply amplifying our capabilities?” These questions, already important to the
medical and rehabilitative fields, loom larger with increasing commodification of pervasive
augmentation technologies, and indicate the verge on which human-machine communication now
finds itself. Through analyses of human and machine agency, mediated through a theory of close
human-machine communication, we argue that the critical element in discussions of human-machine
communication is an increase in sense of agency, extending the traditional human-computer interface
dictum to provide an internal locus of control.
Keywords
Human Augmentics, Human-Machine Communication, Human-Computer Interaction, Agency, Sense
of Agency
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 License.
 Humans have long used tools and technology to augment human capabilities and 
senses. From using a lever to move a large, heavy object to using lenses to correct 
vision or see at a distance or up close, from using a watch to tell the time to using 
writing (and later electricity and electromagnetic waves) to communicate at a 
distance (and store communication, too), the augmentation of human capabilities 
has in every instance led to profound changes in knowledge, behavior, 
communication and culture.1 The miniaturization  of technology during the late 
20th and early 21st centuries has meant that augmentation has increasingly 
occurred with technologies that are not only built on a smaller scale but that are 
also mobile and personal. Mobile media such as phones, GPS trackers, fitness 
bands, and other devices, have become ubiquitous in most parts of the world and 
there is at least one mobile connection for every person on the planet,2 and are on 
or about our bodies almost always. Noting the link between modern technologies 
and the history of media, Adriana de Souza e Silva and Jordan Frith wrote, “for at 
least two centuries, individuals have used mobile media, such as books, 
Walkmans, iPods and mobile phones as technological filters to manage their 
interactions with otherwise uncontrollable surroundings.”3 
It follows from de Souza e Silva’s and Frith’s observation that as 
technology is increasingly miniaturized and networked, at some point electronic 
tools cease to be “simply” tools or “filters,” and become meaningfully part of 
ourselves, augmenting the self, rather than amplifying our capabilities. They are 
part of the milieu, the environment that interfaces and mediates between us and 
the world around us. They become what Mark Weiser and John Seely Brown  
have termed “calm technologies,”4 ones that, according to Anne Galloway’s 
interpretation of the term are “between the periphery and center of our attention, 
outside of conscious awareness (but not completely absent) until we actively 
                                               
1 See Harold Adams Innis, The Bias of Communication (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1964); James W. Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society 
(New York: Routledge, 1992). 
2 Joss Gillet, “Measuring Mobile Penetration,” GSMA Intelligence (22 May 2014). 
Available online at https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/research/2014/05/measuring-
mobile-penetration/430/. Last accessed April 30, 2016. 
3 Adriana De Souza e Silva and Jordan Frith, “Locational Privacy in Public Spaces: 
Media Discourses on Location-Aware Mobile Technologies,” Communication, Culture, 
& Critique 3(4) (2010): 505. 
4 Mark Weiser and John Seely Brown, “The coming age of calm technology,” (05 
October 1996). Available online at 
https://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~ebelding/courses/284/papers/calm.pdf. Last accessed June 30, 
2016. 
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 focus” on them.5 In her essay on the cultural implications of ubiquitous 
computing she goes on to note that these technologies “would be so embedded, so 
pervasive, that (they) could be taken for granted.”6 They are less lever and more 
muscle, it might be said; they cease to be merely “filters to manage… 
interactions” and become interactive, engaging with users and the world, and 
mediating users’ engagements with the world.   
The increasing commodification and commercialization of ubiquitous, 
pervasive augmentation technologies is leading to “a restructuring and re-
bordering of interaction with the world around us… as we increasingly 
communicate, willingly or unknowingly, with machines.”7 Indeed, the verge on 
which human-machine communication now finds itself8 and its intersection with 
wearable and Internet of Things technologies should cause us to focus critically 
on these technological augmentations, which we call Human Augmentics. 
Through analyses of human and machine agency, interposed through a theory of 
close human-machine communication, we argue that the critical element in 
discussions of human-machine communication is an increase in sense of agency, 
extending the traditional human-computer interface dictum to provide an internal 
locus of control, and is the defining feature of Human Augmentics.   
 
Foundations 
Philosophical discussions concerning exceeding human physical and cognitive 
limits with technology have been ongoing since at least the publication of Aldous 
Huxley’s Brave New World.9 The term “transhumanism,” coined by Julian 
Huxley,10 as well as the terms “posthuman” and “cyborg” served as umbrellas 
denoting ideas and efforts in the 1950s and beyond to advance human evolution 
through the use of technology and medicine. The history and philosophical 
threads pertaining to transhumanism are well described in The Transhumanist 
                                               
5 Anne Galloway, “Intimations of Everyday Life: Ubiquitous computing and the city,” 
Cultural Studies 18(2-3) (2010): 388. 
6  Ibid.,  388. 
7 Steve Jones, “People, things, memory and human-machine communication,” 
International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics 10(3) (2014): 255. 
8 David J. Gunkel, “Communication and Artificial Intelligence: Opportunities and 
Challenges for the 21st Century,” Communication +1, 1(1) (2012); Andrea Guzman, 
Imagining the Voice in the Machine: The Ontology of Digital Social Agents. Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago (2015). 
9 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (San Bernadino, CA: The Borgo Press, 1989 [1932]).  
10 Julian Huxley, New Bottles for New Wine (New York: Harper, 1957).  
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 FAQ by Bostrom.11 More recently still, the Quantified Self (QS) movement has 
emphasized self-tracking through individual data collection using wearable 
technologies and sensors.12 The persuasive elements of self tracking have drawn 
on work by B.J. Fogg who coined the term “captology” to denote the connection 
between computing and persuasion.13 In 2011 Robert Kenyon and Jason Leigh, in 
“Human Augmentics: Augmenting Human Evolution,” lay out a largely utopian 
view of Human Augmentics, describing what is essentially a merging of 
transhumanism, captology and QS, defining the term Human Augmentics as 
referring to “technologies for expanding the capabilities and characteristics of 
humans,” or as they put it another way, as “the driving force in the non-biological 
evolution of human.”14 Human Augmentics technologies, they believe, are meant 
to compensate for natural cognitive and physiological limitations “so that our 
abilities can be expanded.”15  
Kenyon and Leigh also suggested that Human Augmentics contains a 
distinguishing philosophical goal focused on increasing quality of life over 
extending life while offering prescriptive criteria Human Augmentics must meet; 
particularly that Human Augmentics devices need to have standard open protocols 
and be open access so that devices and data can be easily integrated. They 
proposed three unique characteristics of Human Augmentics. First, as non-
biological human evolution implies, Human Augmentics are strictly mechanical 
and electrical technologies that do not involve chemicals or other biological 
modifications to achieve goals. However, it does include interfacing directly with 
internal and external biological systems. For example, a device interfacing with 
the brain, which allows an individual to operate a prosthetic arm would be 
considered Human Augmentics. Second, wide distribution of Human Augmentics 
creates ecosystems by bringing devices and users into a network, possibly 
                                               
11Nick Bostrom, “The Transhumanist FAQ”, 2003. Retrieved online at 
http://www.nickbostrom.com/views/transhumanist.pdf. Last accessed April 11, 2016. 
12 Deborah Lupton. “M-health and health promotion: The digital cyborg and surveillance 
society,” Social Theory & Health, 10(3): 2012; Deborah Lupton. “Quantifying the 
body: Monitoring and measuring health in the age of mHealth technologies,” Critical 
Public Health, 23 (2013); Deborah Lupton. “Self-tracking Modes: Reflexive Self-
monitoring and Data Practices,” Conference paper, 2014. Retrived online at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2483549.  Last accessed April 11, 
2016. 
13 B. J. Fogg, Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change What We Think and 
Do (San Francisco: Morgan Kauffman Publishers, 2003). 
14 Robert Kenyon, and Jason Leigh, Human Augmentics: Augmenting Human 
Evolution,” IEEE Engineering Medicine Biology Conference 2011, Boston, MA, USA: 
6758. 
15 Ibid., 6758. 
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 facilitated by cloud computing and body area networks, that constitute a flexible, 
ever adapting feedback system. Third, technologies such as wearable devices, 
virtual reality systems, mobile computing, cloud computing, robots, and other 
Human Augmentics devices will increasingly converge. Smart phones and Google 
Glass offer examples that are already in use but the foundation of Human 
Augmentics rests on these technologies being made available to all with the 
potential for inter-technological communication. 
While Kenyon and Leigh successfully began the process of 
conceptualizing Human Augmentics and provide fertile suggestions for research, 
their article acts primarily as a vision statement, and a largely utopian one at that. 
It lacks conceptual clarity, historical context, and criticality. While Kenyon and 
Leigh make reference to Ray Kurzweil and his notion of the singularity16 they do 
so only to distinguish the goal of Human Augmentics as a means of living better 
rather than living forever. They implicitly acknowledge other human 
augmentation concepts but fail to fully account for the deep historical roots that 
inform Kurzweil, their own work, and human augmentation more broadly. Much 
prior scholarship has considered and experimented with the ways that 
technologies extend human capabilities. The trope of augmentation is especially 
pertinent in computer science. As early as the 1960’s Doug Engelbart was already 
proposing a framework for intellectual augmentation which Cassandra Xia & 
Pattie Maes argued was especially relevant when considering the way software 
and other technological artifacts could augment human intellect.17 There is also a 
need to acknowledge work being done in a similar vein across different 
disciplines, albeit work that uses different terms than transhumanism, cyborg 
theory or Human Augmentics. For instance, the terms eHealth18 and mHealth19 
are increasingly used in health fields to describe electronic and mobile devices 
that are meant to increase health outcomes by helping patients adhere to medical 
guidance. 
Kenyon and Leigh frame Human Augmentics in largely apolitical terms, 
using phrases like “expand capabilities” normatively. Critical issues associated 
                                               
16 Ray Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2006). 
17 Cassandra Xia and Pattie Maes, “The design of artifacts for augmenting intellect.” In 
Proc. AH, ACM (2013). Available online at http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/79875. Last 
accessed April 30, 2016. 
18 Vincenzo Della Mea, “What is e-Health: The Death of Telemedicine?” Journal of 
Medical Internet Research 3(2):e22. Available online at 
http://www.jmir.org/2001/2/e22/. Last accessed April 30, 2016. 
19 Sasan Adibi (Ed.), Mobile Health: A Technology Road Map (Heidelberg: Springer, 
2015). 
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 with notions like (dis)ability and the way that expanding capabilities may not 
necessarily be equated with living well are not addressed. How is living well 
defined and who defines it? Who determines what constitutes ability and 
extending capability? Their article gives a brief acknowledgement that living well 
should mean living well for everyone but it makes no acknowledgment that the 
very idea of suggesting that technologies be used to enhance well-being is 
anything but a neutral stance. The normative tone of their article is best illustrated 
by their imprecise use of the term “rehabilitation.” Most commonly rehabilitation 
is defined as re-enabling, and in a medical context rehabilitation is the process of 
restoring lost faculties, lost abilities, or lost health (for instance, hearing aids for 
patients who have suffered progressive age-related hearing loss). By contrast 
habilitation is the process of developing faculties or abilities that are expected, but 
for some reason are not and have never been present (for instance, hearing aids 
for infants and very young children who have never experienced the expected 
level of hearing sensitivity.)  Strictly speaking, habilitation could also mean the 
development of faculties or abilities beyond an expected level, or which 
effectively are not expected to exist (for instance, hearing aids which extend the 
frequency of human hearing above the expected range of 20 KHz.)  However, it 
might be appropriate to use a qualifying prefix (super-habilitation, perhaps) to 
distinguish such usage. 
Our goal is to illuminate Human Augmentics’ reliance on notions of 
agency and the central role communication plays in its technological formation 
and thereby illustrate its potential as a useful, critical theoretical tool with which 
to understand the convergence of human and machine agency. In our view what 
sets apart Human Augmentics from other efforts to enhance humans is the 
articulation of human and machine, through the combination of sensors and 
sensing and reliance on human-machine communication, that articulates in turn 
with human agency. 
Maxwell Mehlman, in the introduction to his book The Price of 
Perfection, asked many trenchant questions concerning the ethics and politics of 
human chemical, medical and genetic enhancement, but concluded it by writing 
that “we cannot stop (enhancement), nor should we.”20 Mehlman, however, 
moves a step closer to a notion of agency in the book’s discussion of athletic 
performance, citing the President’s Council on Bioethics that “distinguishes 
between ‘intelligible agency’ or ‘getting better because of what we do’... and 
‘unintelligible agency,’ or ‘getting better because of what is done to us.’”21 He 
critiques these as arbitrary distinctions, tied only to the effort a human makes, and 
                                               
20 Maxwell Mehlman, The Price of Perfection: Individualism and Society in the Era of 
Biomedical Enhancement (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 254. 
21 Ibid., 65. 
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 does not further discuss agency. Drawing on frameworks developed by Russell 
and Norvig, and Norman22we believe a human’s agency increases when a device 
increases his or her ability to perceive the world, to affect the world, to model the 
world, or to manage goals. Drawing further on Norman, a human’s sense of 
agency increases when no device at his or her command imposes a mismatch 
between intent and allowable actions, or an undue burden on understanding the 
state of the tool. A path to such technologies requires intelligent devices of 
sufficient sophistication to anticipate and respond to our needs as smoothly as do 
our limbs, as well as advanced sensory feedback to present information as 
smoothly as our native senses.  
 
Agency in Relation to Socio-Material-Technical Forces 
For our argument, we locate agency and sense of agency in the intra and 
interpersonal levels of communication between humans and devices as opposed to 
thinking through issues of agency in larger socio-material contexts. We admit that 
we cannot separate agency entirely from larger contexts, but we can focus on 
parts of them. The work necessarily reduces the field of view to focus on a limited 
slice of the socio-technical reality that makes up Human Augmentics, leaving a 
challenge we hope will be taken up by other scholars in the future. We do not 
contend to make broad claims about the general state of agency in this paper, but 
we do argue that using specific definitions of agency and sense of agency as 
constructs can help us think through what is unique about human-machine 
communication arising with Human Augmentics. Still, being aware of the likely 
pushback our use of agency will invoke, it is worthwhile to provide some context 
and defense of our position. 
With changes in technology and social theory, there has been a quick shift 
in understanding agency that rejects the idea “that autonomous agency is 
contained within individuals and is a distinguishing capacity of the human.”23 
Proponents of Actor-Network Theory champion a notion of agency that grants 
equal status to humans and non-humans in a largely symmetric network where 
agency is produced in the interactions between actors rather than something 
inherently stable within actors.24 Summarizing Michel Callon and John Law’s 
                                               
22 Stuart Russell, Peter Norvig. Artificial Intelligence: A modern approach. (Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1995); Don Norman. The design of everyday things (Revised 
and expanded edition.) (New York: Basic Books, 2013). 
23 Lucy A. Suchman, Human-machine reconfigurations: plans and situated actions (2nd 
ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 211. 
24 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
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 theorization of the “hybrid collective”25 Owain Jones and Paul Cloke state, 
“agency is viewed as being spun between different actors (or ‘actants’) rather than 
manifested as solitary or unitary intent and it is decoupled from subject – object 
distinctions. The hybrids are then seen as mobilized and assembled into 
associative networks in which agency represents the collective capacity for action 
by humans and non-human.”26 Echoing the non-binary, symmetrical, and 
interactive formation of agency, Mark Hansen argues that “we must rethink 
agency as the effect of global patterns of activity across scales of networks, where 
absolutely no privilege is given to any particular individual or node, to any level 
of complexity” because “agency is resolutely not the prerogative of privileged 
individual actors.”27 
While reconfigurations of agency have helped push social theory in more 
critical directions, better accounting for the complexity and entanglement that 
displace control from individuals within the power relations of a larger socio-
technical-material world, their absolute emphasis on symmetry and non-binary 
relationships denies the potential for individual resistance. In order to get from 
notions of autonomous human agency to agency as produced through networks of 
symmetric interaction, ANT suspends “the concepts of human intentionality and 
creativity.”28 According to Victor Kaptelinin and Bonnie Nardi, the notion of 
agency articulated by ANT, while especially useful given advances in AI 
technologies, is still too limiting as it denies the “particular potency of human 
agency.”29  
In their formulation of agency, Victor Kaptelinin and Bonnie Nardi 
suggest that agency can be defined as the “ability and need to act,” later 
narrowing the definition by adding “acting is producing an effect according to an 
intention.”30 This definition is similar to the definition we propose in the next 
section, but pertinent to the current conversation, their definition leads them to 
identify two types of needs that precipitate action, biological and cultural. In their 
conceptualization, “artifacts are special agents that are the product of cultural 
                                               
25 Michel Callon and John Law, “Agency and the Hybrid Collectif,” South Atlantic 
Quarterly, 94 (1995): 481-507. 
26 Owain Jones and Paul Cloke, “Non-Human Agencies: Trees in Place and Time,” in 
Material Agency: Toward a Non-Anthropocentric Approach, eds. Carl Knappett and 
Lambros Malafouris (New York: Springer Press, 2008), 84 - 85. 
27 Mark B.N. Hansen, Feed-Forward: On the Future of Twenty-First Century Media. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 2. 
28 Victor Kaptelinin and Bonnie A. Nardi, Acting with Technology: Activity Theory and 
Interaction Design (1st paperback ed.) (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009), 241.  
29 Ibid., 241. 
30 Ibid., 242. 
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 needs. Humans have gained some control over our needs through the design and 
deployment of artifacts that embody our intentions and desires.”31 Moreover, and 
in line with our own conceptualization of the role of tools in increasingly agency, 
they state, “activity theory conceptualized the potency of human agency in part 
through the principle of mediation: tools empower in mediating between people 
and the world.”32 However, as more collaborator than mediator, Human 
Augmentics necessarily pushes us to think about the agency developed through 
emerging forms of human-machine communication in different ways. 
Unraveling issues of agency is a complicated matter, one with profound 
implications on multiple levels. While there will always be social, political, and 
technical contexts to account for when considering the impact of technologies on 
human agency and visa versa, we choose to focus on agency as it arises at the 
intersection of humans and machines, where agency is co-constructed in intra and 
interpersonal communicative processes. While these forms of communication can 
never be entirely divorced from the larger socio-technical context – indeed, they 
arise within and are constrained by these contexts, we can provide one useful 
framework that focuses on those particular intersections. What the framework 
may give up in explanatory power on a systemic level, it makes up for by 
assessing a more intimate level of communication, one that is not just constrained 
by socio-technical contexts but also serves as an anchoring point shaping those 
contexts. Locating the argument at these levels of communication provides a 
meaningful model to extend work in Human-Machine Communication (HMC) 
that hinges on issues of agency.33 
 
Humans, Agency and Machines 
Although there is no universally agreed upon definition of agent or agency,34 we 
draw on ideas from modern philosophy and computer science to define an agent 
                                               
31 Ibid., 248. 
32 Ibid., 248. 
33 David J. Gunkel, “Communication and Artificial Intelligence: Opportunities and 
Challenges for the 21st Century,” Communication +1, 1(1) (2012); Andrea Guzman, 
Imagining the Voice in the Machine: The Ontology of Digital Social Agents. Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago (2015); Steve Jones, “People, things, 
memory and human-machine communication,” International Journal of Media and 
Cultural Politics 10(3) (2014). 
34 Xabier E. Barandiaran, Ezequiel Di Paolo, and Marieke Rohde, "Defining agency: 
Individuality, normativity, asymmetry, and spatio-temporality in action," Adaptive 
Behavior 17, no. 5 (2009); Michael Wooldridge. An introduction to multiagent systems. 
(John Wiley & Sons, 2009). 
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 as one which acts with a goal-oriented purpose or purposes, and agency as the 
ability to act effectively with respect to goals. We focus on this formulation of 
agency, not because it is the only conception of human agency, nor because it is a 
form of agency unique to human beings, but because it is a very useful framework 
for the discussion of the human relationship with the use, and more especially the 
design, of tools. In particular, this formulation captures through its focus on goals 
what Pickering35 describes as the intentionality of humans, although as we shall 
describe below we do not reserve intentionality to humans but note its continuing 
extension into our tools through the field of artificial intelligence, and 
acknowledge its presence without further comment in the biological world.  As 
well, the notion of effectivity captures a notion of power similar to the meaning of 
agency in practice theory as discussed by Kipnis,36 Laidlaw,37 and Ortner,38 
although considering the primary "larger structure" as the physical environment 
itself.   
The philosophical work of Donald Davidson links actions, reasons, and 
reasoning, noting that when asked the reason for a particular action, people often 
respond with a description of the expected or intended result of the action itself.39  
Davidson claims that the expected result is itself the reason, which he formalizes 
as: An agent acts with intention if it is well-disposed toward (i.e., if it desires, 
wishes, has as a goal, or in general “has a pro-attitude” toward) certain classes of 
actions, and further believes that some particular action is a member of that class.  
Further, these broad classes of actions toward which an agent might have a pro-
attitude are themselves results based. For example, one might desire light in a 
darkened room; thus, one would have a pro-attitude toward the broad class of 
actions expected to bring light, including: Flipping a light switch; opening 
curtains during a sunny day; lighting a fire in a fireplace, etc.  The desire for light 
would, under Davidson’s framework, be the reason for flipping a light switch.   
                                               
35 Andrew Pickering, “The mangle of practice: Agency and emergence in the sociology 
of science,” American Journal of Sociology (1993): 559-589. 
36 Andrew Kipnis, "Agency between humanism and posthumanism: Latour and his 
opponents," HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5.2 (2015): 43-58. 
37 James Laidlaw, "Agency and responsibility: perhaps you can have too much of a good 
thing," Ordinary ethics: anthropology, language, and action (2010): 143-164. 
38 Sherry B. Ortner, Anthropology and social theory: Culture, power, and the acting 
subject (Duke University Press, 2006). 
39 Donald Davidson, "Actions, reasons, and causes." The Journal of Philosophy 60, no. 
23 (1963): 685-700. 
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 Michael Bratman later sharpens this idea into the Belief-Desire-Intention 
framework,40 where beliefs represent an agent’s store of information about the 
world, desires represent an agent’s desired configuration or configurations of the 
world, and intentions represent the finished or in-process planning that links 
beliefs and desires. In this framework, intentions and desires are both actions 
toward which an agent has pro-attitudes, but only intentions are “action-
controlling.” Whereas desires are any pro-attitude actions, even mutually 
conflicting actions, intentions are those pro-attitude actions which carry a level of 
commitment and which serve to pin or prune an agent’s planning. While an agent 
might easily desire to spend the same sum of money several times over (an 
example of mutually conflicting desires), once an agent intends to spend a sum of 
money in a particular way, that sum is restricted for the purposes of further 
planning. Bratman later participated in the extension of his framework into the 
Belief-Desire-Intention (“BDI”) model of intelligent software agents,41 using 
similar definitions. However, the BDI model focuses on the internal states and 
actions of the agent, while saying little directly about the formation of beliefs. 
  Subsequent elaborations in computer science, and philosophy (such as 
enactivism42), have maintained focus on the internal states of the agent but also 
expanded and formalized a key idea: that agents are understood to be embodied in 
the world,43 as well as holding desires, beliefs and intentions about the world.44 
This formal elevation of the environment allows the analysis of the agent 
and environment as two components of a larger system, yielding a number of 
results. First, this separation leads to the idea of the agent and environment acting 
in a loop. The agent acts on the environment, which reacts (in accordance with its 
own rules) to the agent, which acts again on the environment, etc. Second, it calls 
attention to the boundary between the two, and processes at that boundary. The 
agent takes in information from the environment through sensors, and acts on the 
environment in an attempt to influence how it changes through effectors. Third, 
                                               
40 Michael Bratman, Intention, plans, and practical reason (Harvard University Press: 
Cambridge, MA, 1987). 
41 Michael E. Bratman,  David J. Israel, and Martha E. Pollack, "Plans and 
resource‐ bounded practical reasoning." Computational intelligence 4, no. 3 (1988): 
349-355. 
42 Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo, “Participatory Sense-Making: An Enactive 
Approach to Social Cognition,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (2007), 
485-507. 
43 Strictly, embedded in an environment, for an agent may be a purely software construct 
embedded in a simulated world. 
44 Randall D. Beer, "A dynamical systems perspective on agent-environment interaction." 
Artificial intelligence 72, no. 1 (1995): 173-215; Rodney A. Brooks, "Intelligence 
without representation." Artificial Intelligence 47, no. 1 (1991). 
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 with the conceptual boundaries between agent and environment cleanly drawn, it 
allows a more systemic conceptualization of Bratman’s beliefs, desires, and 
intentions, specifically, that beliefs are the results of repeated sensing operations 
leading to an understanding of the environment; desires are configurations of the 
environment different from and preferable to the agent’s current understanding; 
and intentions are hypothetical actions leading to those preferred environmental 
configurations. Finally, it leads to a concise and robust definition of an agent as, 
“a system situated within and a part of an environment that senses that 
environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and so as to 
effect what it senses in the future.”45 With emphasis placed on the agent, and with 
the response of the environment left implicit, the agent loop can be 
conceptualized concisely as: 
● Sense - Agent receives information about the environment (possibly 
partial and imperfect) through its sensors; 
● Understand - Agent incorporates that information (possibly imperfectly) 
into previous information to form beliefs about the world; 
● Manage Goals - Agent generates intentional plans informed by its own 
goals and inflected by its current understanding of the environment (and of 
how the environment reacts) in order to bring about its desires; 
● Act - Agent acts on the environment.46  
This notion of a loop is intended to be a general framework.  The precise 
mechanisms of sensing, environment modeling, goal formation/planning, and 
acting are intentionally unspecified in the artificial intelligence community, 
because not all agents share, e.g., common sensing modalities (indeed, as we 
discuss below, even naturally occurring agents do not share such modalities) and 
to foster research into each step in the loop. This loop is not intended to be rigid 
or simplistic.  While simple agents may in fact sense, then understand, then plan, 
then act, more sophisticated agents perform these processes concurrently, with 
information flowing along the direction of the loop. In particular, whether a 
vehicle is driven by a human or an autonomous computer, the controlling agent  
continuously and concurrently performs all those processes: sensory information 
is received in a constant stream, but does not halt while that information updates 
the agent’s model of the world. Likewise, model updates do not halt while new 
models cause a revision of plans. However, the loop has a direction since an 
                                               
45 Stan Franklin, and Art Graesser, "Is it an Agent, or just a Program?: A Taxonomy for 
Autonomous Agents." In Intelligent agents III agent theories, architectures, and 
languages, pp. 21-35. (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1996.): 25. 
46 Stuart Russell, Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A modern approach. (Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1995). 
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 agent’s current understanding of the environment depends on current and past 
perceptions; an agent’s current plans depend on the current understanding; and an 
agent’s current action is selected in accordance with the current plan. 
The partition of space into an agent embedded in an environment is 
conceptual, not absolute. In reality, human beings and physically embodied agents 
are part of an environment. In particular, agents may not (and in particular, 
humans do not) have perfect knowledge of their physical selves, but rely on 
perceptions and actions to determine their own true state. The conceptual partition 
is often drawn such that much of the agent’s physical apparatus is sensed as 
though part of the environment, yet acts as though part of the agent.   
As we focus on the individual processes of this loop, we show that 
enhancing a human agent’s capability in any of these processes is tantamount to 
increasing his or her agency, i.e., the ability to act effectively with respect to goals. 
Devices which enhance human capabilities (and therefore agency) in this regard 
are tools. However, as we will discuss later, this increase of agency is not 
sufficient for a tool to be considered Human Augmentics. Consider the scenario 
of a vacationing traveler faced with navigating an unfamiliar city and having a 
rough itinerary: several specific locations must be visited; several tasks must be 
performed, though not necessarily at unique locations; and several more locations 
or tasks are optional.  In this scenario, we discuss various devices intended to 
affect the multiple facets of the user’s agency loop.  For illustrative purposes only, 
we stipulate that these interactions are positive, which is to say, the devices 
function reliably, function as intended, and function without unintended 
consequence.  We return later to cases where this oversimplification does not 
obtain. 
Sensing represents movement of information from the environment to the 
agent. Sensory devices may enhance natural human senses (e.g., sight, hearing, 
etc.), or may map information not normally available to human beings onto those 
senses. In the context of our navigation scenario, an example of the former is a 
pair of field glasses, which enhance the range of human sight enabling the 
navigator to read street signs or addresses from a greater distance; an example of 
the latter is a haptic device using a tactile channel to provide persistent orientation 
information, constantly signaling true north, or constantly signaling the direction 
of the next turn or location on the itinerary. 
  Understanding represents the continual refinement of the agent’s static 
and dynamic models of the world, that is, both as the world is at a point in time, 
and as the world might evolve based on particular actions or inaction.  A tool 
relevant to the project of urban navigation which aids a human in understanding 
an environment is a simple street map: a codified, visually interpretable collection 
of past observations and measurements of a location (in this case, a city.) It is 
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 important to recognize that a map is not simply a list or collection of past 
perceptions by the self and/or others, but an organized integration of past 
perceptions, from different but related locations and at different times; no 
individual observation is necessary to the map, but each individual observation 
enhances it and each absence degrades it.  
As humans are complex agents which hold multiple goals at different 
scales, some of which may be conflicting or mutually exclusive, and whose 
priorities may change significantly and often over time, managing goals is a 
necessity. Accordingly, managing goals represents both the construction of 
sequences of actions meant to bring about individual goals, as well as the 
balancing and prioritization of multiple goals. Extending the example of a street 
map, sufficiently sophisticated computerized maps may automate the drudgery of 
detailed route-planning by simply performing that action, and may even allow for 
rapid trade-offs of related plans. Which alternative route is fastest? Which route 
requires least distance travelled? In a more complex setting, such devices may be 
aware of fluid or unrelated user goals, and pro-actively provide suggestions and 
alternatives. In the example of navigating an unfamiliar city, such an application 
might, given a particular place as a required destination, and mailing a postcard as 
a required goal without a specific location, provide lists of post offices and hours 
of operation near that location. 
Finally, acting represents the (attempt at) modification of the environment 
by the agent. In human beings, this is limited to modifications of the position of 
the body, in reaction to which (the agent believes) the rest of the environment will 
respond: flexing the fingers and drawing back the arm just so will move an object 
from here to there; done with sufficient speed, the object may continue to move; 
movement of lungs, mouth, and vocal tract produces sound, to which other agents 
may react, etc. Many devices exist which increase the power, effectiveness or 
precision of an action, or even add actions not typically associated with human 
beings. However, in the context of our agency-extending urban navigation 
example, we may consider vehicles, which increase our hypothetical vacationer’s  
rate of travel and ability to carry packages. 
In each stage of this extended example, a human agent uses tools to 
increase performance of one of the four basic agent processes. In each case, the 
human’s agency, or ability to act effectively, is enhanced in turn, although we 
recognize that the simplicity of the discussion stems from the illustrative 
assumption that these technologies do, in fact, “just work” as described. In the 
sensing process, our human agent has increased the performance of his or her 
vision by increasing its range; and/or used a tactile channel to “add” a literal sense 
of direction where none had existed previously, thus increasing the performance 
of his or her sensory system overall. These abilities interact directly with the 
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 subsequent phases of the agency loop. Being able to read street signs at a distance 
or know true north with precision makes it easier to build a mental model of the 
environment, makes planning easier, and may reduce extended information-
gathering actions.47  
Similarly, having an accurate map of any sort, paper or electronic, 
increases the agent’s understanding of his or her environment, thus again resulting 
in fewer necessary observations to build a mental model (and as before, fewer 
actions in support of information gathering) and simpler planning and goal 
management. Should the mapping device be electronic and pro-active, it may 
simply perform many aspects of planning and goal management for the user.  
Modern GPS-enabled maps make navigation possible with almost no recourse to 
observation other than accident avoidance and the monitoring of the device itself, 
and almost no static understanding of the environment (although a dynamic 
understanding of traffic rules is still necessary). Finally, the possession of a 
vehicle which increases the agent’s capacity to act can drastically reduce the time 
spent acting.   
Establishing a common thread, this scenario highlights how tools may 
increase the ability of an agent to perform one or more of the processes associated 
with the agent loop of sensing, understanding, managing goals, and acting. This 
reduces the time spent either in the stage of the loop in question, or in other stages 
of the loop, or both. The end result is a more effective cycling through the loop, or 
the ability to act more effectively, relative to the goals of the agent.  This is 
precisely an increase in agency as we define it. 
All tools assist in the processes of the agent loop in some fashion or 
another, therefore all tools increase agency as we have defined it. However, not 
all tools are Human Augmentics. The gap lies in the difference between agency, 
and sense of agency. 
 
Agency and Sense of Agency  
Whereas agency, as defined in the previous section, relates to being able to act 
more effectively in relation to an agent’s goals, a human’s sense of agency derives 
from interaction with devices used to achieve goals. By increasing our sense of 
agency, Human Augmentics expands our potential agency. What sets Human 
Augmentics apart as a unique category of technology is the degree to which it 
could increase a human’s sense of agency. A human’s sense of agency increases 
                                               
47 Information gathering is typically a sensing process, but the limited range of human 
vision may require certain actions, such as walking closer to a street sign, prior to an 
effective sensing process. 
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 when no device at his or her command imposes a mismatch between intent and 
allowable actions, or an undue burden on understanding the state of the tool.48 By 
being attached to the body (directly, as in the case of wearables, or indirectly, as 
in the case of sensors) and environment in increasingly seamless ways, Human 
Augmentics devices integrate human-machine communication to bridge the gulfs 
between human, machine and environment. 
The notion of agency is important for those working in the area of Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) as one central aim is to facilitate design of 
interactions that seem effortless; the popular Apple slogan, “it just works,” sums 
up the HCI philosophy and the assumed expectation of users. But every time a 
device does not work as we anticipate it should, it decreases our sense of agency. 
Hannah Limerick, James Moore, and David Coyle define a sense of agency as 
“the experience of controlling one’s own actions and, through this control, 
affecting the external world.”49 Sense of agency from this perspective assumes a 
mostly cognitivist model of the world that locates our sense of agency as derived 
internally. Offering a more substantial view of interaction, Don Norman, 
following from James Gibson,50 defines a sense of agency according to an 
ecological perspective, taking into account that this sense of agency is entangled 
in a complex web that includes humans, devices, actions, and the environment.51 
Taking an ecological perspective helps account for a sense of agency as being co-
constructed between a person, the devices at the person’s disposal, and the 
environments in which they are embedded. In other words, to borrow from 
Deborah Lupton, it accounts for a “relational assemblage”52 that is vital to 
understanding emerging configurations of human-machine communication.  
According to Norman, actions involve both execution and evaluation.53 
The gulfs that result from a thing not responding in the way a user anticipates and 
                                               
48 Don Norman, The design of everyday things (Revised and expanded edition.) (New 
York: Basic Books, 2013).  
49 Hannah Limerick, James W. Moore, and David Coyle, “Empirical Evidence for a 
Diminished Sense of Agency in Speech Interfaces” (ACM Press, 2015): 3967. 
50 James Jerome Gibson, The senses considered as perceptual systems (London: Allen & 
Unwin, 1968). 
51 Paul Dourish, Where the action is: the foundations of embodied interaction 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001). 
52 Deborah Lupton, “Digital Bodies” pre-print of a chapter published in Routledge 
Handbook of Physical Cultural Studies, edited by D. Andrews, M.Silk, and H. Thorpe, 
London: Routledge, (2016). Available online at 
http://www.academia.edu/14501199/Digital_Bodies. Last accessed April 30th, 2016. 
53 Note that in Norman’s parlance, “execution” corresponds roughly to goal forming and 
acting in our previous defined agent loop, while “evaluation” corresponds roughly to 
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 not giving the user information to change their actions to use it successfully are 
referred to as the gulf of execution and gulf of evaluation, respectively.54 The gulf 
of execution speaks to a mismatch, or a barrier, between a set of desired actions 
and a set of allowable actions.  In HCI, a large gulf of execution leads to interface 
designs that are artificial-seeming, intricate, fussy, and lead to a sense that the 
human is serving the machine rather than the other way around. Conversely, a 
small gulf helps ensure that the human feels in command of the device. 
The gulf of evaluation “reflects the amount of effort that the person must 
make to interpret the physical state of the device and determine how well the 
expectations and intentions have been met.”55 The gulf of evaluation accounts for 
the mismatch between human understanding of the system and the underlying 
reality of the system. In HCI, systems with a large gulf of evaluation lead to users 
with large uncertainties as to the effects of their actions, and correspondingly high 
error rates, which again directly increases the sense that the user is employing a 
tool, and a badly designed one at that. The gulf is small when the device provides 
information about its state in a form that is easy to get, is easy to interpret, and 
matches the way the person thinks about the system.”56 
Bridging the gulf of evaluation is achieved through feedback and aligned 
conceptual models. While Norman is focused on how designers can use his 
models and concepts to help fill the gulfs, our contention is that Human 
Augmentics fill the gulfs of execution and evaluation in a dynamic way that could 
not only increase a human’s sense of agency but also expand it. By incorporating 
miniaturization, advanced computing, sensory technology, and integrated textiles, 
Human Augmentics technologies attempt to close the gulfs of execution and 
evaluation. In doing so, they function below the level of conscious awareness as 
“calm technologies,” matching actions with intentions “without being 
overwhelming or distracting.”57 Instead of extensions, these technologies are 
meant to collaborate with the human through seamless integration with the user 
and the environment. Their imagined functioning is so user-adaptive, properly 
anticipatory, and environmentally aware, they all but eradicate the gulfs which 
bring technologies into the full awareness of human interlocutors.  
                                                                                                                                
sensing and understanding.  Further, in Norman’s conception, and in HCI in general, 
there is a particular emphasis on evaluating and acting on tools.  
54 Don Norman, The design of everyday things (Revised and expanded edition.) (New 
York: Basic Books, 2013), 39. 
55 Norman, The design of everyday things, 39. 
56 Norman, The design of everyday things, 39. 
57 Anne Galloway, “Intimations of Everyday Life: Ubiquitous computing and the city,” 
Cultural Studies 18(2-3) (2010): 388. 
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 In addition to helping close the gulfs, establishing a link between 
intentions and affordances, which account for the ecological nature of perceptual 
systems, helps explain how Human Augmentics could increase and expand a 
human’s sense of agency. In establishing his anti-representationalist theory of 
perception, James Gibson develops the notion of affordances to explain the action 
possibilities supported by an environment.58 His conception indicates that 
affordances are both intrinsic to the environment while also being a relational 
property. Don Norman imports his notion of affordances into HCI59 by using it to 
help explain how designs succeed and fail to be user friendly, which in this case 
indicates an increase or decrease in the sense of agency.60 The affordances of a 
technology, well designed, help align user intents with the allowable actions of 
the technology. In William Graver’s terms, a technology that provides perceptual 
information about its affordances results in a “perceptible affordance,” making 
explicit the allowable actions of a technology61. Instead of the intents informing 
the allowable actions, the affordances of technologies and environments often 
guide the intents of humans. The perceptible affordance of the technology 
prompts the human to adapt their intentions to fit the limitations of the 
technology. Even though well designed, the human is still operating under the 
constraints of the technology. Unable to adapt to the affordances of human 
interlocutors, devices given the moniker “smart,” are actually anything but.  
Human Augmentics, however, could potentially expand the possible 
intentions of humans through turning, what William Graver refers to as “hidden 
                                               
58 James J. Gibson, “The theory of affordances,” in Perceiving, Acting and Knowing: 
Toward an Ecological Psychology, ed. Robert Shaw and John Bransford, (Hinsdale, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1977). 
59 It should be noted that Norman’s notion of affordances breaks from Gibson, in that it 
relies more on an individual’s cognitive ability than suggesting indelible qualities of the 
environment as Gibson intended. According to Victor Kaptelinin’s entry into the 2nd 
edition of the Encyclopedia of Human-Computer Interaction affordances, 
https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/book/the-encyclopedia-of-human-
computer-interaction-2nd-ed/affordances, Norman’s use of the term was highly 
influential in HCI but his lack of concise development of the concept created 
ambiguities of use in the field which Norman attempted to address in his 1999 
publication in, In Interactions, “Affordances, Conventions, and Design.”  
60 Don Norman, The design of everyday things (Revised and expanded edition.) (New 
York: Basic Books, 2013); James Gibson, The senses considered as perceptual systems 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1968). 
61 William Graver, “Technology Affordances,” In proceedings of the ACM CHI 91 
Human Factors in Computing Systems Conference, ed. Scott P. Robertson, et al. April 
28 - June 5, 1991 (New Orleans, Louisiana): 80.  
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 affordances” into “perceptible affordances,”62 or what Don Norman refers to as 
“perceived affordances.”63  By being able to sense data about the world that could 
be imperceptible to humans, including embodied information unknown to the 
human interlocutor, these devices could reveal affordances in our environments 
and technologies that would otherwise be hidden, allowing the human to expand 
their world of potential actions and their sense of agency along with it.  
Our contention is that just as non-augmentic technologies (i.e., tools) can 
increase and expand our agency by allowing us to better sense, understand, and 
act on the world, Human Augmentics could increase and expand our sense of 
agency by providing information about ourselves, our environments, and our 
tools, persistently augmenting our senses in ways that were hitherto impossible, 
as well as by reacting to or anticipating our intentions as smoothly as our own 
bodies. Instead of blending with the human to mediate as “functional organs,”64 or 
to alter our body schema65, both of which rely on reshaping the human to achieve 
the actions of the machine, Human Augmentics are meant to bend to human 
intention.  By being more adaptable to the individual and the environment, 
Human Augmentics can in principle correct for “problems with interactive 
technology (that) lay in the imbalance between situated organization of practical 
action and the regimented models that systems embody.”66 The devices operate 
more flexibly and dynamically, matching human intention, but more 
fundamentally, the devices more adequately close the gulfs of execution and 
evaluation, creating feedback mechanisms that actively account for, and adapt to, 
users, devices, and environments. 
This formulation, that a technology might be considered Human 
Augmentic if it both expands the user’s agency and sense of agency 
simultaneously is aspirational as well as definitional, serving as a roadmap for 
discourse and development.  Our previous extended example of the agency loop, 
for instance, made the simplifying assumption that the technologies in question 
simply worked, properly and reliably. However, any user of GPS navigation 
                                               
62 Graver, “Technology Affordances”: 80. 
63 Don Norman, “Affordances, Conventions, and Design,” In Interaction 6 (3): 38. 
64 Victor Kaptelinin and Bonnie A. Nardi, Acting with Technology: Activity Theory and 
Interaction Design (1st paperback ed.) (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009), 249. 
65 Nina B. Dohn, “Affordances Revisited: Articulating a Merleau-Pontian view,” In 
International Journal of Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning, 4(2), 2009: 151 
- 170.  
66 Paul Dourish, Where the action is: the foundations of embodied interaction. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 122, summarizing an argument Lucy Suchman 
makes in her first edition of Plans and Situated Actions: The Problem of Human-
Machine Communication (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
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 applications who has found him or herself miles from their destination due to poor 
directions knows that this is not so. Any similar assumption of technologies which 
increase a user’s sense of agency must be treated with similar skepticism, for 
reasons ranging from the technical difficulty of implementing such features and 
their associated failure modes, to the difficulty of truly untangling and/or 
measuring a sense of agency, to broader questions of human agency confounded 
by social, cultural, and historical forces. Two brief examples serve to illustrate 
these broader questions, before moving on to extended cases studies that expand 
on these points. 
First, consider existing therapeutic devices such as (highly experimental) 
wheelchairs controlled by brain-computer interfaces.  Such interfaces function by 
making direct or indirect measurements of brain activity, interpreting them, and 
converting them into machine instructions.  This technology, as described, may 
simply fail, producing no action or some action contrary to the user intent, thus 
confounding user agency, user sense of agency, or both.  However, consider a 
more advanced version of this technology, coupled to video cameras 
supplementing the brain measurements with contextual information from the 
environment, e.g., for collision avoidance or for smooth alignment of the vehicle 
as it passes through a narrow portal. (Derry and Argall describe a similar system, 
although fusing a more conventional therapeutic interface with environmental 
context67.) Such devices may fail in increasingly sophisticated and problematic 
ways, such as smoothly aligning the vehicle for passage through the wrong door.  
When extended from the therapeutic to Human Augmentics domain, these 
problematic scenarios highlight the critical need to think carefully through such 
questions of agency, intent, and sense of agency. 
Second, consider the case of a device which assists a user in managing 
goals. Such a use-case falls logically from our definition of agency as acting 
effectively with intent, and from our definition of the agent loop.  But while some 
use cases may be benign (for instance, the case of route planning with multiple 
destinations) other, more captological approaches pose difficulties. A fitness and 
diet mobile computer application may be seen as an act of externally mediated 
self-persuasion, or, depending on its construction and authorship, may be seen as 
a sophisticated advertising campaign on the part of the application designers.  
Again, careful analyses are necessary, even in the case of robust technological 
implementations, to distinguish mere tools, from deceptive or constraining 
agency-reducing devices, from Human Augmentic technologies.   
                                               
67 Matthew Derry and Argall Brenna, "Automated doorway detection for assistive shared-
control wheelchairs," Robotics and Automation (ICRA), 2013 IEEE International 
Conference on. IEEE, 2013. 
Novak et al. / Human Augmentics
communication+1 Vol. 5 [2016], Iss. 1, Article 8
19
  
Human Augmentics Scenarios 
Three technologies, SpiderSense, BLEEX and LiveNet, serve as concrete 
examples that illustrate how Human Augmentics technologies may increase both 
a user’s agency and sense of agency, making them more aware of their 
surroundings and allowing them to make more informed decisions or enhancing 
their actions. These devices act as agents themselves, sensing the environment 
(including the user) using sensors, understand and manage goals using their 
processing capabilities, and act by using HCI methodologies to communicate with 
the user or act on the user’s behalf. However, all three also provide examples of 
how failure to function as Human Augmentic threatens human agency in ways 
that demands critical attention. 
 
SpiderSense  
SpiderSense68 is a wearable suit that allows the wearer to feel the environment on 
his or her skin. SpiderSense consists of thirteen ultrasonic rangefinders that detect 
obstacles, an Arduino for processing that information, and thirteen servo motors 
to provide haptic feedback. Drawing on our definition of Human Augmentics, 
SpiderSense’s intent is to increase the user’s agency and sense of agency by 
making them more aware of their surroundings. However, due to the sensors’ 
limitations and missing contextual information, it might not always succeed in its 
purpose, as we will see in the preliminary experiments. The device itself adheres 
to the agent loop, as it senses the environment through the ultrasonic rangefinders; 
understands the environment through processing and filtering the raw signals 
from the sensors; and acts by nudging the wearer through the servo motor. The 
device’s loop of agency is intertwined with the human’s, as the user’s 
understanding of the environment depends on the current and past feedback of the 
device, their plan depends on the understanding from the previous step, and their 
selected action depends on the plan. While SpiderSense does not have a memory 
(the model of the environment in the “understand” step depends on only the 
current sensor readings) it does react based on the human’s selected plan, i.e., it is 
a reflex agent. For example, after an obstacle has been detected and the user has 
been informed through the use of pressure to their skin, if the user continues to 
                                               
68 Victor Mateevitsi, Brad Haggadone, Jason Leigh, Brian Kunzer, and Robert V. 
Kenyon, “Sensing the Environment Through SpiderSense,” in Proceedings of the 4th 
Augmented Human International Conference, AH ’13 (New York, NY, USA: ACM, 
2013). 
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 move towards that object the pressure will increase. Furthermore because of 
SpiderSense’s haptic feedback, the human’s sense of agency increases, as there is 
(ideally) no mismatch between intent and allowable actions. 
During preliminary experiments, participants were able to navigate 
hallways and detect pedestrians while walking blindfolded outdoors. In another 
experiment, participants were able to detect people that were walking around 
them, report their position by pointing, and accurately throw styrofoam stars at 
them. The device was tested primarily on blindfolded individuals with some early 
secondary feedback from people with visual disabilities. Participants in general 
were able to navigate, detect obstacles and people, and were very positive about 
the technology and its potential. The visually impaired participants in particular 
asked for a more portable device without tethered cables that would be easier to 
wear. All participants reported that they were able to immediately use the device 
and that the pressure feedback was easily understood; people wearing the device 
for the first time, without any prior training or instructions were able to navigate 
simple courses and perform a pointing task (where a user walks around the 
participant wearing the device). 
In the paper the authors also describe an experiment, performed in the 
library of their university, that confused participants instead of increasing their 
agency and sense of agency. In this experiment, subjects had to walk pre-
described paths between bookshelves without touching them. During the 
experiments, subjects were unable to distinguish an opening from an empty book 
shelf, therefore feeling confused. This scenario is a good example of Human 
Augmentics technologies that fail to address all environments and use cases, as 
they are restricted by their sensors’ limitations, computing power, lack of 
contextual information, etc. Researchers, engineers and designers need to be 
cautious when claiming that a technology is Human Augmentics and address 
when and why a the device might not work as expected. 
For sports and other physical activities, feedback about body posture, 
movement, positioning, etc., are essential for skill development and improvement. 
Traditionally, athletes have trained under the supervision of a personal trainer or a 
coach, who would give them feedback based on their experience, knowledge, and 
external perspective, or they may have viewed photos or videos of their 
performance. However, even experienced coaches and athletes may not detect or 
see small micromovements that are incorrect. Human Augmentics devices can 
improve learning and motor skills by sensing, understanding and acting in real 
time. Devices like SpiderSense that use the skin to provide feedback are known in 
the literature as tactile displays. These devices can communicate messages 
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 through pressure, vibration69, lateral skin deformation, temperature or electric 
stimulation. Studies have shown that tactile stimulation can be beneficial for 
learning and improving motor skills, such as dancing,70 rowing,71 karate,72  
archery73 and snowboarding.74 Preliminary user studies have also shown promise 
in maintaining a high performance level with elite athletes in soccer, cycling, and 
speed skating.75 By sensing user movement and behavior, these devices 
understand the movement and goals of the user and act by providing feedback as 
to improve their learning and motor skills. As we described earlier, the devices act 
as agents that go through the agent loop, thereby increasing the user’s agency and 
sense of agency. Another use of tactile displays is for orientation and mobility. 
Bach-y-Rita and Collins showed that using a 20x20 vibrotactile array that 
encoded a camera video feed to vibrotactile stimulation on the back of the patient, 
blind participants were able to recognize the position, size, shape, and orientation 
of visible objects as well as track moving targets.76 
                                               
69 Carter Compton Collins, “Tactile Television - Mechanical and Electrical Image 
Projection,” IEEE Transactions on Man-Machine Systems 11, no. 1 (March 1970); Paul 
Bach-Y-Rita et al., “Vision Substitution by Tactile Image Projection,” Nature 221, no. 
5184 (March 8, 1969). 
70 Akio Nakamura et al., “Multimodal Presentation Method for a Dance Training 
System,” in CHI ’05 Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 
CHI EA ’05 (New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2005). 
71 Jan B.F. van Erp, Ian Saturday, and Chris Jansen, “Application of Tactile Displays in 
Sports: Where To, How and When to Move,” in Proc. Eurohaptics, 2006. 
72 Aaron Bloomfield and Norman I. Badler, “Virtual Training via Vibrotactile Arrays,” 
Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments 17, no. 2 (March 17, 2008). 
73 Heng Gu, “Exploring Sensory Augmentation Through Tactile Interfaces,” in Adjunct 
Proceedings of the 2015 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and 
Ubiquitous Computing and Proceedings of the 2015 ACM International Symposium on 
Wearable Computers, UbiComp/ISWC’15 Adjunct (New York, NY, USA: ACM, 
2015). 
74 Daniel Spelmezan, “An Investigation into the Use of Tactile Instructions in 
Snowboarding,” in Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Human-
Computer Interaction with Mobile Devices and Services, MobileHCI ’12 (New York, 
NY, USA: ACM, 2012). 
75 Jan B.F. van Erp, Ian Saturday, and Chris Jansen, “Application of Tactile Displays in 
Sports: Where To, How and When to Move,” in Proc. Eurohaptics, 2006. 
76 Paul Bach-Y-Rita et al., “Vision Substitution by Tactile Image Projection,” Nature 
221, no. 5184 (March 8, 1969); Carter Compton Collins, “Tactile Television - 
Mechanical and Electrical Image Projection,” IEEE Transactions on Man-Machine 
Systems 11, no. 1 (March 1970); For a more thorough survey see: Vasilios G. 
Chouvardas, Amalia N. Miliou, and Miltiadis K. Hatalis, “Tactile Display 
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The Berkeley Lower Extremity Exoskeleton (BLEEX) 
Even though human strength and endurance is constrained by our bodies’ physical 
limitations, Human Augmentics technologies may allow us to overcome these 
limitations. Exoskeletons are still in development, technologies that aim to allow 
us to walk further, and carry heavier payloads without getting tired. By 
augmenting our bodies with an exoskeleton, we can perform tasks more easily 
and safely, without putting our bodies to danger. BLEEX is a lower extremity 
exoskeleton with seven degrees of freedom per leg, four of which are powered by 
linear hydraulic actuators.77 In contrast with previous exoskeletons such as 
HAL,78 BLEEX is capable of carrying a payload in addition to its own weight. 
Participants wearing BLEEX can carry a payload of up to 75 kg, walking at 
speeds exceeding 4.5 km/hr. BLEEX increases human carrying capacity and 
endurance in rough and uneven terrains that are inaccessible by vehicles. BLEEX 
senses the operator’s movements through a set of sensors, understands the 
movement of the operator through a control algorithm that has been trained using 
Clinical Gait Analysis (CGA) and acts by moving the linear actuators and thus 
providing enhanced strength and endurance. BLEEX fits well into our proposed 
Human Augmentics model. Following the agent’s loop, it senses the user’s body 
posture and movement, understands the user’s intention and acts by synchronizing 
the movement of the exoskeleton legs with the user’s legs thus allowing them to 
carry the payload. BLEEX increases the user’s agency, by enhancing their 
strength and endurance, and the user’s sense of agency by allowing them to act 
and manage goals—that otherwise would not be possible—without the machine 
getting in their way. However, as with any technology in its infancy, there are 
some limitations as the device’s kinematics and dynamics do not fully match the 
human’s, imposing a mismatch between intent and allowable actions and 
therefore decreasing the user’s sense of agency. Human Augmentics technologies 
that overcome the body’s physical limitations, like strength and endurance, need 
to be carefully designed, tested and made explicit as a malfunction or wrong 
movement can lead to serious injuries. 
                                                                                                                                
Applications: A State of the Art Survey,” in Proceedings of the 2nd Balkan Conference 
in Informatics, 2005. 
77 Adam B. Zoss, Hami Kazerooni, and Andrew Chu, “Biomechanical Design of the 
Berkeley Lower Extremity Exoskeleton (BLEEX),” IEEE/ASME Transactions on 
Mechatronics 11, no. 2 (April 2006). 
78 Hiroaki Kawamoto and Yoshiyuki Sankai, “Power Assist System HAL-3 for Gait 
Disorder Person,” in Computers Helping People with Special Needs, ed. Klaus 
Miesenberger, Joachim Klaus, and Wolfgang Zagler, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science 2398 (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2002). 
Novak et al. / Human Augmentics
communication+1 Vol. 5 [2016], Iss. 1, Article 8
23
  
LiveNet 
Proactive monitoring of patients can reduce healthcare costs and detect early signs 
of health problems. LiveNet79 is a wearable platform for long-term health 
monitoring and patient feedback that aims to improve quality of life and delay the 
onset of medical conditions. It measures body vitals and senses the context using 
specialized sensors, understands the sensor data and analyzes patterns in data 
collected from all LiveNet users, and acts by providing real-time results to the 
user. What sets LiveNet apart from SpiderSense and BLEEX is its use of data 
collected from all users to create statistical machine learning models that are then 
used to classify and distinguish between different states. For instance, the system 
was able to distinguish with 95% accuracy shivering from general body 
movements in various activities, nearly 100% accuracy in predicting when a 
patient will experience dyskinesia (a symptom of Parkinson’s disease) and with 
84% accuracy in classifying between 20 daily activities (such as vacuuming, 
eating, folding laundry, etc.). Human Augmentics devices that use the cloud and 
machine or deep learning techniques can have the advantage of learning from the 
general population when something happens and therefore being able to identify 
small patterns or anomalies that otherwise would be unnoticeable. By using this 
knowledge they can predict what will happen next or can distinguish between a 
correct and incorrect form and can act by intervening in real-time to increase our 
sense of agency. But as with the previous examples, the system is not 100% 
accurate: while 84% accuracy is a great statistical result, there is still a 16% 
chance that the device will falsely recognize an activity or condition, affecting the 
human’s model of the world or their goal management. Ramifications of such an 
event could be minimal, from recognizing a wrong activity and having an 
incorrect calorie calculations, to very serious ones, like taking a drug when they 
shouldn’t or having negative psychological effects. As is the case with most all 
extrapolations from the aggregate to the individual the consequences require 
forethought and the desires behind them require critique. 
 
Conclusion 
These examples illustrate some of the ways that Human Augmentics can be 
operationalized via devices that increase a person’s agency as well as sense of 
agency. They as clearly illustrate that the engagement of human and machine they 
                                               
79 Michael Sung, Carl Marci, and Alex Pentland, “Wearable Feedback Systems for 
Rehabilitation,” Journal of NeuroEngineering and Rehabilitation 2 (2005). 
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 incorporate requires critical analysis lest Human Augmentics becomes another 
ambiguous (though nevertheless heuristic) totem, like Marshall McLuhan’s notion 
of “extensions of man”80 or Andreas Hassan’s “computer as substitute 
consciousness,”81 or, worse, that it becomes another utopian expression of an 
uncritical symbiosis of human and machine. We wish therefore to emphasize that 
Human Augmentics devices are implicated and embedded in the dynamic 
practices of design, use and and understanding of self and environment, and ought 
not be merely conveyors of information about the environment or user, and 
instead could be actively engaged in processing and communicating information 
about the user and environment. Human Augmentics devices operate in the verge 
between body and machine, wherein sensing of the environment and the body are 
the fulcrum, and Human-Machine Communication is the lever. By dynamically 
mapping, in real time, what had hitherto been unmappable (synchronously and/or 
invisible to the senses) Human Augmentics at once recedes as a technology and 
grows as an interlocutor. As James Carey reminds us any act of mapping is “a 
reduction of information… that bring(s) the same environment alive in different 
ways.”82 Human Augmentics devices do not merely represent reality but act 
collaboratively with the user in its construction. 
 There are two (related) consequences of this collaboration, one specific to 
design and Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), the other general in regard to the 
intersection of technology and power. As we noted earlier in our essay Human 
Augmentics devices all but eradicate the gulfs which bring technologies into the 
full awareness of users. However, such a paradigm “intentionally hid[es] the 
phenomena and materiality of interfaces,” and “smooth[s] over the natural edges, 
seams and transitions that constitutes all technical systems, [and] entails a loss of 
understanding and agency for both designers and users.”83 In the case of design 
for Human Augmentics devices it is necessary not only to undertake device 
testing and user testing but also to evaluate in place and in context. Special 
emphasis should be given during design and testing, as well as during ongoing 
evaluation in use, on testing cognitive load, sensory competition, agency and 
sense of agency.  
                                               
80 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1994). 
81 Andreas Huyssen, A., “Mapping the Postmodern,” New German Critique 33 (1984), 5-
52. 
82 James W. Carey, Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society (New 
York: Routledge, 1992), 28. 
83 Timo Arnall, "No to NoUI." (March 13 2013.) Retrieved online: 
http://www.elasticspace.com/2013/03/no-to-no-ui. Last accessed April 25th, 2016. 
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 Emphasis on cognition and agency will also be required in future research. 
Whereas Human Augmentics relies on a reconciliation of and collaboration 
between human and machine it is necessary to understand the simultaneous, 
multiple, contingent elements comprising agency and behavior. In the view of 
those espousing enactivism84 the importance of intersubjectivity not only between 
humans and between humans and agents but also between agents is important in 
understanding the dynamics of interaction.85  As Torrance & Froese86  noted 
based on constructing experimental models with simple artificial agents, in 
response to the emergence of participatory sense-making,  “the inter-individual 
interaction process, taken as a whole system, can have important properties that in 
principle can neither be separated from the being and doing of the interacting 
individuals, nor be reduced to the being and doing of those individuals alone.”87 
The paradox, and challenge to HCI, is that while Human Augmentics devices 
increase agency and sense of agency they also rely on placing increasing trust in 
agents while simultaneously making the agents less visible, obscuring 
opportunities for “reflexivity in technical practice” of the kind called for by 
Steven Harrison, Phoebe Sengers, and Deborah Tatar.88  
By closing the gulfs we may eradicate the “seams and scars” in current 
interfaces that create “places where interventions can be made, or where potential 
can be acted upon.”89 One consequence, for example, might be that by increasing 
performance in an agent loop we may experience a loss of serendipity. A map that 
works too well could create a path dependency that would not allow us to stray, 
get lost, discover something new. But Human Augmentics devices may also 
create new spaces for intervention. The maps Human Augmentics devices, like all 
technologies, produce are symbolic realities, ones with which and over which 
users struggle. They require continual communication, interpretation and 
                                               
84 Francisco J. Varela, Eleanor Rosch and Evan Thompson, The Embodied Mind: 
Cognitivie Science and Human Experience. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). 
85 Hanne De Jaegher and Ezequiel Di Paolo, “Participatory Sense-Making: An Enactive 
Approach to Social Cognition,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (2007), 
485-507. 
86 Steve Torrance and Tom Froese, “An Inter-Enactive Approach to Agency: 
Participatory Sense-Making, Dynamics, and Sociality,” Humana.Mente 15 (2011), 21-
53. 
87 Torrance and Froese, 38. 
88 Steven Harrison, Phoebe Sengers and Deborah Tatar, “Making Epistemological 
Trouble: Third-Paradigm HCI as Successor Science,” Interacting With Computers 23 
(2011): 385-392. 
89 Anne Galloway, “Seams and Scars, or How to Locate Accountability in Collaborative 
Work” In Uncommon Ground, ed. Cathy Brickwood, Bronac Ferran, David Garcia and 
Tim Putnam. (Amsterdam: BIS Publishers, 2007), 152-58. 
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 understanding.  Unlike communication technologies with which we already have 
experience, and unlike other types of wearables or fitness trackers, Human 
Augmentics devices do not merely mediate or provide data, they collaborate. By 
adapting to the intentions of the human rather than requiring humans to adapt to 
the intentions of the technology, Human Augmentics alters sense of agency. It 
does this by transducing affordances from technology to the information 
generated, stored, and exchanged through the human-machine assemblage.  
Human Augmentics devices collect information about the environment 
and people imperceptible to humans and then relay that information in ways that 
expand a human’s sense for potential actions. The information proper becomes 
the affordance rather than the technology itself and provides opportunities for 
enaction, of “technology beyond that of tools, reaching as far as ubiquitous 
accompaniment of sense-making.”90 The information generated by sensing the 
body and the environment in ways directly unavailable to the human perceptual 
system creates a layer of information about the body and the environment that 
affords the potential for controlling the body and environment in new ways. 
Likewise, the information becomes an affordance for the devices, informing it 
how to adapt to the user. Thus, a person’s sense of agency is not merely increased 
by communication with the device, but expanded and enacted through the 
information affordances generated in the verge the devices paradoxically obscure. 
Human Augmentics is thereby about bending instead of blending. While 
the vision of ubiquitous and mobile computing that is seamless may invoke 
notions of cyborgification, the idea is not that technologies will merge with 
humans, subsuming them with, or into, the machine, rather that by altering forms 
of communication, devices more properly bend to the will of human users, 
reinforcing and expanding potential agency. The point of Human Augmentics is 
to develop communication between the human, machine, and environment 
premised on collaboration rather than co-option, engagement rather than 
estrangement, to increase human agency and a human’s sense of agency, not to 
eradicate the human in pursuit of becoming something other. Human Augmentics, 
then, is focused on the intersections between human and machine, about the 
information that is generated between agents, and the affordances that information 
provides to potentially increase agency. 
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